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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between efficiency and market structure for a 
sample of industrial facilities dispersed among the USA states. In order to measure the 
relevant efficiency scores, we use a Data Development Analysis (DEA) allowing for 
the inclusion of desirable and undesirable (toxic chemical releases) outputs in the 
production function. In the next stage, we utilise the bootstrapped quantile regression 
methodology to uncover possible non-linear relationships between efficiency and 
competition at the mean and at various quantiles before and after the global financial 
crisis (2002 and 2012). In this way, we impose no functional form constraints on 
parameter values over the conditional distribution of the dependent variable 
(efficiency). At the same time, we estimate at which part of its conditional distribution 
function, the efficiency is located and draw substantial conclusions about the range of 
policy measures obtained. The empirical findings, indicate that the relationship 
between efficiency and market concentration did not remain unchanged in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis. The empirical results survived robustness checks 
under the inclusion of an alternative market concentration indicator (CR8).  
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1.  Introduction 
Industrial pollution affects a broad spectrum of the efficient use of natural and 
environmental resources to economic activity (Harrington et al, 2014; Bi and Khanna, 
2012). Over the last five years researchers have tried to shed light on this relationship 
by focusing on the well-functioning of market forces (competition) in reducing the 
level of environmental degradation (see for example Simon and Prince, 2016; Polemis 
and Stengos, 2017). It is well documented from prior theoretical studies that increased 
competition in an industry may result in lower levels of production per facility not 
allowing pollution to grow (Farber and Martin, 1986). On the other hand, recent 
theoretical work claims that increased competition triggers the incentives of a firm to 
reduce costs in order to reduce its final prices and thus the pollution control activities 
(Shleifer, 2004; Mansur, 2007).  
Despite the profound interest by policy makers and government officials on 
the possible spillovers between market structure usually proxied by the level of 
concentration (the inverse of competition) and environmental efficiency the existing 
literature is still in its infancy with controversial results (Polemis, 2017). These can be 
justified on the grounds that many academic researchers acknowledge that 
competition may have positive as well as negative effects on environmental pollution 
(Polemis and Stengos, 2017; Simon and Prince, 2016; Branco and Villas-Boas, 2015; 
Shleifer, 2004). More specifically, in a recent study, Chen et al, (2018), investigate the 
causal link between market structure and industry performance using a micro panel 
data set of USA manufacturing industries over the period 1958-2007. They argue that 
there is a non-monotonic relationship between market structure and total-factor 
productivity. Similarly, Polemis, (2017) employed a semiparametric fixed effects 
estimator to examine the impact of market structure on the level of toxic chemical 
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releases to a sample of four-digit industrial sectors among the USA states. Contrary to 
the parametric results, the study uncovers an inverted “U-shaped” relationship 
between industrial output and toxic chemical releases when market concentration is 
present.    
Our approach is one of the very few attempts at modeling and quantifying the 
relationship between efficiency and market structure using facility level data. For this 
reason, we formulate a number of research questions including inter alia the 
following: In what way market structure affect environmental efficiency? What is the 
underlying mechanism for competition to affect the levels of (desirable and 
undesirable) output in the production process? In what way does the level of 
efficiency is determined before and after the global financial crisis? Why does the 
level of efficiency is lower (higher) under the presence of (non)-competitive market 
conditions? Lastly, what policy implications could be drawn in order to boost an 
efficient abatement mechanism?  
To address these concerns, we rely on quantile regressions (QR) methodology. 
It is crucial to mention that quantile regressions impose no function form constraints 
on parameter values over the conditional distribution of the dependent variable 
(Apergis and Christou, 2015). In other words, quantile regression is more robust to 
outliers than ordinary least squares regression, and is semiparametric as it avoids 
assumptions about the parametric distribution of the error process. In contrast to 
standard linear regression techniques, which summarize the average relationship 
between a set of regressors and the outcome variable based on the conditional mean 
function, this type of regression describes the relationship at different points over the 
conditional distribution of the deponent variable (i.e efficiency scores). At the same 
time, we estimate at which part of its conditional distribution function, the efficiency 
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is located and draw substantial conclusions about the range of policy measures 
obtained.  
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we build for the first time 
in the empirical literature a DEA framework in which the level of industrial toxic 
chemical releases constitute the undesirable output (local pollutant). Second, we try to 
analyse the possible correlations between the efficiency scores (drawn from the DEA 
model on each USA state) with the level of market structure. In this way, we argue 
that an industry needs to obtain a certain level of market concentration (competition) 
in order to achieve (technical) efficiency. Third, we make use of econometric 
techniques (quantile regressions) to determine possible non-linear interactions 
between the level of industrial efficiency and market concentration. In this way we are 
able to draw sharp inference on the adjustment mechanism underlying these non-
linearities before and after the global financial crisis that hit the USA.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. 
Section 3 outlines the DEA framework along with the quantile regression 
methodology, while Section 4 reports the empirical findings and provides the 
necessary robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2.  Data  
 
The primary source for our data was drawn from the Toxics Release Inventory 
(TRI) which covers the period 1987-2015. The latter is a plant-level database that 
includes information about the industrial facility (e.g., name, state zip code, primary 
industry, etc), and releases of toxic chemicals to the air and water, as well as transfers 
to any kind of land disposal in the US territory. The reason for using industrial toxic 
chemical releases as a proxy for pollution and not the standard pollutants such as CO2, 
NOX or SO2 is that the latter are only available at a state level. However, since the 
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Decision Making Units (DMU) used in the DEA are industrial facilities we decide to 
utilize local pollutants generated by each distinct industrial plant.     
The structural variables such as market concentration, level of employment, 
value added that correspond to each 6-digit code were drawn from the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and especially from Manufacturing Industry 
Database (CES). This database contains annual industry-level data from 1958-2011 on 
output, employment, payroll and other input costs, investment, capital stocks, and 
various industry-specific price indexes. Especially for the year 2012, and due to data 
restrictions concerning the level of market concentration as measured by certain 
indicators (i.e CR8, HHI), we used data directly from the US Census of 
Manufacturers. Similarly to Polemis and Stengos (2017) and in order to check for the 
robustness of our findings, we take two measures of market concentration: HHI is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the 50 largest firms in the industry, and CR8 which is 
the sum of the market shares of the eight largest firms of in the sector (concentration 
ratio). It is worth mentioning that our measures of market structure reveal the 
existence or the absence of effective competition in the industry since concentration is 
simply the inverse of competition (Polemis and Stengos, 2017; Simon and Prince, 
2016). 
Lastly, our sample consists of hundreds of observations. However, we 
excluded observations for facilities with missing values for toxic chemical releases. 
As stated before, we used the TRI database in order to incorporate the level of toxic 
chemical releases in our sample. In this way we merge chemical releases data with 
national industry concentration ratios drawn from the NBER database and the Census 
of Manufacturers (only for the year 2012). It is worth mentioning that the final date 
(2012), represents the last year for which data regarding the Census of Manufacturers 
were available at the time the research was conducted.  
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3. Proposed methodology  
3.1 Efficiency measurement 
Data Envelopment Analysis (hereafter DEA) method may be used for 
evaluating the efficiency of a decision making unit (DMU) in relation to other DMUs. 
DEA has been widely applied in evaluating relative efficiencies in many scientific 
applications. A problem demanding attention when using DEA stems when 
undesirable outputs are present. In this case as efficiency is achieved by minimizing 
inputs and maximizing outputs we may desire to retain same inputs with higher level 
of desirable and lower level of undesirable outputs. This implies that undesirable 
outputs require a special treatment in model specifications. 
  Fare et al. (1989) distinguished desirable and undesirable outputs and 
proposed a non-linear programming model in evaluating DMUs efficiencies when 
coping with both desirable and undesirable outputs. Various other efficiency 
measurements in the presence of undesirable outputs have been proposed. Likewise 
one approach to deal with this problem is shifting undesirable outputs into inputs and 
then usey DEA. Seiford and Zhu (2002) proposed radial measures presuming that 
efficiency may be achieved by increasing desirable and reduce undesirable outputs at 
the same time. In doing so a multiplication of undesirable outputs by -1 is proposed 
together with the application of a satisfactory translation vector to convert all negative 
undesirable outputs to positive. These two transformations of altering position and 
translation endow us with the same efficient frontiers (Scheel 2001) with the Seiford 
and Zhu technique to be valid when assuming variable returns to scale (VRS) and the 
two techniques to supply dissimilar inefficiency scores.  
 In a different way undesirable output may be considered as a desirable output. 
In a production function setup, Fare et al. (1989) considered desirable and undesirable 
outputs asymmetrically and computed environmental technology using distance 
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functions non-parametrically. Simultaneously imposing strong and weak disposability 
environmental performance indicators were computed. But Cooper et al. (2007) 
indicate a disadvantage of radial models when coping with undesirable outputs as they 
ignore slacks in the efficiency measurement. 
In our model specification let the input vector be denoted as Nx  generating 
both undesirable Ju   and desirable
M  outputs. For the environmental 
technology and following Shephard (1970) and Färe and Primont (1995) output sets 
are assumed closed and bounded with inputs freely disposable. In addition, 
environmental output set  P x  is identified when outputs are weakly disposable, that 
is    ,u P x  with 0 1  and    , .u P x   This weak disposability hypothesis 
indicates that reducing undesirable outputs is costly taking place with a comparable 
reduction in desirable outputs. An additional hypothesis refers to the null jointness 
postulation of desirable and undesirable outputs entailing that undesirable outputs are 
by-products when generating desirable outputs, namely    ,u P x  and 0u   
implying that 0  .  
The DDF approach is used to compute DMUs’ environmental efficiency levels 
utilizing a direction vector  , u     to help decreasing undesirable and increasing 
desirable outputs. In this way, the environmental efficiency score for a DMU 'k  (for 
DMUs 1,...,k K ) can be attained from: 
 
   
' ' '
' '
, , ; , max
. . , ,
k k k
u
k k
u
D x u
s t u P x


   
  

  
       (1)  
where the intensity variables are not negative and with constant return to scale 
implying a more appropriate assumption when analysing environmental problems 
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(Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2012). Environmental efficiency is signified when 
 ' ' ', , ; , 0k k k uD x u      and environmental inefficiency when  ' ' ', , ; , 0k k k uD x u     .  
 Specifically, we use the value of shipments (SHIP) as a proxy for desirable  
output, while one undesirable output accounting for the toxic chemical releases (REL) 
is incorporated in our analysis. The inputs in the production process are total real 
capital stock (CAP), as a proxy for capital, total employment (EMP), as a proxy for 
labor and finally cost of electricity and fuels (ENER) as a proxy for energy. 
Moreover, we assume that the three inputs affect the desirable output in a separable 
way since neither capital stock and employment nor energy cost of an industrial 
facility are linked with its production process. In contrast, the production of the 
desirable output generates the toxic chemical pollutants distorting the environmental 
conditions in a non-separable way (Halkos and Polemis, 2018).  
3.2.  Econometric framework 
Quantile regression is used in modelling the calculated efficiencies. OLS relies 
on a strong simplification estimating the influence of the independent variables on the 
mean of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. This is due to the fact 
that explanatory variables may not only verify the mean but may well affect other 
parameters of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable.  
On the other hand, quantile regressions permit the consideration of the full 
conditional distribution of the dependent variable and it is less uncertain compared to 
the OLS (mean) regression allowing the estimated parameters to fluctuate at different 
points of the dependent variable’s conditional distribution. As a nonparametric 
method, quantile regression requires no functional form and is not susceptible to 
extreme values. This is due to minimization of residuals and not their squares as in 
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OLS. At the same time, considering various different quantile regressions allows us a 
more comprehensive depiction of the fundamental conditional distribution.  
Quantile regressions are especially useful when dealing with non-identically 
distributed data (Distante et, al, 2018). In these situations one should expect to 
observe significant discrepancies in the estimated ‘slopes’ at different quantiles with 
respect a given set of covariates (Machado and Mata, 2000). 
The estimated slopes of quantile regressions assess the change in a specific 
quantile of the dependent variable caused by a unitary change in the explanatory 
variable. This helps comparisons among quantiles of how much they are affected from 
explicit characteristics relative to other quantiles. In this way, quantile regressions are 
useful in the presence of heteroskedasticity and/or no normality in the disturbance 
term (Buchinsky 1998). Moreover, quantile regressions also provide a richer 
characterization of the data, allowing us to consider the impact of a covariate on the 
entire distribution of the dependent variable, not merely its conditional mean. It is 
worth mentioning that QR is invariant to monotonic transformations such as natural 
logarithms.   
If we assume a random variable Y with a probability distribution function 
(Halkos, 2011) 
)Pr()( yYyF             (2) 
such as  0 < λ < 1 when the i quantile is defined as the lowest y assuring the condition 
)( yF  
 iyFyQ  )(:inf)(         (3) 
The quantile regression expands the simple model including the independent variables 
X that assume linear specification for the conditional quantile of the dependent 
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variable Y given the values of the matrix P of the explanatory variables X. 
Particularly,  
)())(|(  jiQ          (4) 
where   ))(({arg)( )(   j
j
jmm       (5) 
For large samples, the coefficients of quantile regressions are normally distributed 
(Koenker, 2005).    
The quantile density function  S  may be calculated with the use of the 
Kernel density estimator (Powell 1986, Buchinsky 1995, Jones 1992). Specifically,  
   
1
1
1ˆ( )
ˆ ( )
(1/ )
i
j
i
ij
S
i c L c

 


  
  
  

                         (6) 
where ˆ j the residuals of the quantile regression. 
4.  Results and discussion  
4.1  Efficiency and econometric findings   
Table 1 presents the results of the regional environmental efficiency estimates 
derived from our DEA model before (pre-crisis) and after (post-crisis) the financial 
crisis (2002 and 2012 respectively). Specifically, before the financial crisis, the 
efficiency results reveal that, 3 out of 50 states (Alaska, Hawaii and New Mexico) are 
reported to be environmentally efficient in terms of the anthropogenic emissions since 
their scores are close to unity. On the other hand, 3 out of 50 states report the lowest 
efficiency values ranging from 0.500 to 0.594. These are Nevada, Rhode Island and 
Arizona. The descriptive statistics reveal low disparities of regional environmental 
efficiencies among US states since the standard deviation and the coefficient of 
variation (CV) appear to be relatively low ranging from 0.080 to 0.118. Moreover, on 
average terms USA states have an efficiency level equal to 0.646. This means that US 
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regions on average terms are able to reduce their toxic chemical releases (undesirable 
output) generated by the manufacturing sectors by 54.6% to reach the efficiency 
frontier.1  
On the contrary when we stress our attention to the post-crisis model (see 
column 2), there are significant differences in the magnitude of the efficiency scores. 
More specifically, nearly all the US states portray a significant reduction in the 
efficiency scores with Arizona, New Hampshire and Wisconsin depicting the lowest 
values. On the contrary Alaska, Hawaii and New Mexico remain the “leaders” in the 
efficiency ranking but with a smaller magnitude. It is worth mentioning that the 
average efficiency score has been reduced during the last ten years of our analysis by 
16,6% reaching the level of 0.564 (or 56,4%). The latter is close to the inefficiency 
score reported in the pre-crisis model, revealing that the financial crisis has also 
impacted a large global economy such as the USA.  
In the next step we estimate separately the following (parametric) models by 
employing OLS and QR techniques for the two years of our study (2002 and 2012). 
Similarly to other empirical studies (Halkos, 2003; Millimet et al., 2003; Zarzoso and 
Morancho, 2004; Halkos and Tzeremes, 2009; Halkos and Polemis, 2017), we 
estimate the following simple (parametric) model:  
ijijijij uLHHIbLHHIbEFF 
2
21                            (7) 
i = 2002, 2012 Years and j = 1,2,…2,391 DMUs  
where EFF denotes the efficiency scores per DMU at time i =2002, 2012 and 
LHHIij is the logged Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the 50 largest firms in each of 
the six-digit industry sector included in the analysis. Finally uij is the i.i.d disturbance 
term.  
                                               
1 Since the mean environmental efficiency score equals to 0.649 or 64.9%%, the rest amount 0.546 
(54.6%) denotes the inefficiency score.     
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Table 1: Results of the DEA efficiency scores per state  
State 2002  2012  
Alaska 1.000 (1) 1.000 (1) 
Alabama 0.647 (68) 0.490 (68) 
Arkansas 0.627 (47) 0.537 (47) 
Arizona  0.594 (10) 0.418 (11) 
California  0.698 (103) 0.604 (102)  
Colorado 0.625 (11) 0.576 (12) 
Connecticut  0.648 (40) 0.549 (40) 
Delaware  0.685 (10) 0.511 (10) 
Florida  0.602 (39) 0.480 (34) 
Georgia 0.621 (79)  0.463 (78) 
Hawaii  0.849 (3)  0.868 (3) 
Iowa 0.707 (53) 0.565 (53) 
Idaho 0.648 (10) 0.463 (9) 
Illinois  0.679 (148) 0.660 (149) 
Indiana  0.667 (84)  0.557 (87) 
Kansas  0.763 (35) 0.592 (35) 
Kentucky  0.653 (51) 0.517 (52) 
Louisiana  0.754 (68) 0.637 (67) 
Massachusetts  0.616 (42) 0.636 (42) 
Maryland 0.644 (15) 0.636 (15) 
Maine  0.643 (17) 0.396 (18) 
Michigan  0.643 (93) 0.559 (96) 
Minnesota  0.628 (53) 0.583 (53) 
Missouri 0.662 (62)  0.565 (62) 
Mississippi  0.629 (33) 0.494 (32) 
Montana 0.727 (9) 0.623 (9) 
North Carolina 0.700 (76) 0.516 (74) 
North Dakota 0.718 (8) 0.629 (7) 
Nebraska 0.736 (19) 0.613 (19) 
New Hampshire  0.637 (10) 0.436 (10) 
New Jersey  0.711 (45) 0.588 (45) 
New Mexico 0.880 (4) 0.806 (4) 
Nevada 0.500 (1) 0.281 (1) 
New York 0.663 (60) 0.508 (61) 
Ohio 0.647 (197) 0.537 (198) 
Oklahoma 0.686 (27) 0.629 (28) 
Oregon 0.616 (35) 0.494 (36)  
Pennsylvania  0.623 (135) 0.538 (135) 
Rhode Island 0.534 (11) 0.542 (11) 
South Carolina 0.676 (60) 0.448 (60) 
South Dakota 0.698 (4) 0.581 (4)  
Tennessee  0.647 (60) 0.492 (59) 
Texas 0.735 (196) 0.614 (197) 
Utah 0.699 (14) 0.596 (14) 
Virginia 0.647 (49) 0.553 (48) 
Vermont  0.625 (7) 0.590 (6) 
Washington  0.689 (34) 0.541 (34) 
Wisconsin  0.621 (116) 0.470 (114) 
West Virginia 0.723 (22) 0.533 (22) 
Wyoming  0.720 (7) 0.716 (6) 
Descriptives  
Mean 0.676 0.564 
Standard deviation  0.080 0.114 
Median  0.658 0.555 
Max  1.000 1.000 
Min 0.500 0.281 
Coefficient of variation (CV) 0.118 0.203 
Notes: The table reports the mean efficiency scores of all the sample DMUs by region (state) for the 
years 2002 and 2012. The efficiency scores were estimated with the DEA methodology using annual 
frontiers and constant returns to scale (CRS). The benchmark best practice frontier for DEA is 
efficiency equal to 1. The number in parentheses are the power plants (DMUs) in each of the USA 
state.  
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The degree of the polynomial has been determined by the maximum number 
of statistically significant powers. In our case, third and higher degree polynomial 
specifications have the extra powers of CR8 to be not statistically significant. Besides, 
we choose a quadratic specification since alternative specifications such as log-linear 
and log-log could admit only monotonic (and nonlinear) relationships (Dai et al, 
2014). As it is evident the key variables of interest are b1 and b2. Therefore equation 
(27), implies that when the relationship between market structure and efficiency is 
nonmonotonic, the sign of b1 should be different from b2.  
In Figures 1A and 2A of the Appendix, we plot the dependent variable (EFF) 
by quantiles for the years 2002 and 2012 respectively. From the careful inspection of 
Figure 1A, it is obvious that even at the 50th quantile (median) the states depict 
relatively moderate efficiency scores (around 0.55 or less). It is worth mentioning that 
the CDF of the dependent variable remains stable until the 30th quantile and equal to 
0.5. On the contrary, there is an increasing upward trend when we cross the 60th 
quantile in which it is evident that efficiency scores exceed the level of 0.65 on 
average reaching the highest level of 1.00 from the 80th quantile and henceforth. The 
situation is different when we examining the CDF associated with the dependent 
variable (EFF) for the year after the financial crisis (2012).  
Specifically, from Figure 2A, it is evident that the CDF does not portray 
significant variation since it follows an increasing upward trend from the low 
quantiles (especially from the 10th) until the high quantiles (80th quantile). The above 
findings reveal that neither of the two CDFs of the dependent variable follow a 
symmetric pattern.  
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Table 2: Estimation results for the year 2002  
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 
Quantiles τ  OLS 
Q (0.01) Q (0.05) Q(0.10) Q(0.15) Q(0.20) Q(0.25) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90)+ Q(0.95)+ 
LHHI -0.0722*** 
(-3.63) 
-0.00031 
(-1.68) 
-0.00100 
(-0.83) 
-0.00808 
(-1.56) 
-0.0420 
(-1.53) 
-0.156*** 
(-4.36) 
-0.165*** 
(-33.82) 
-0.172*** 
(-14.83) 
-0.191*** 
(-11.12) 
-0.256*** 
(-7.08) 
-0.252** 
(-2.72) 
-0.211*** 
(-6.17) 
0.144*** 
(3.63) 
0.2026*** 
(11.08) 
0.0929*** 
(33.57) 
LHHI2 0.00796*** 
(4.14) 
0.00002 
(1.64) 
0.0000774 
(0.80) 
0.000639 
(1.54) 
0.00335 
(1.52) 
0.0125*** 
(4.37) 
0.0132*** 
(26.68) 
0.0141*** 
(11.98) 
0.0161*** 
(9.91) 
0.0235*** 
(6.07) 
0.0260** 
(2.83) 
0.0237*** 
(7.13) 
-0.0164** 
(-2.58) 
-0.0155*** 
(-9.45) 
-0.0071*** 
(-28.84) 
Constant 0.805*** 
(16.72) 
0.50101*** 
(851.62) 
0.503*** 
(135.81) 
0.525*** 
(32.80) 
0.631*** 
(7.43) 
0.988*** 
(8.81) 
1.012*** 
(93.25) 
1.027*** 
(37.70) 
1.082*** 
(25.59) 
1.232*** 
(15.77) 
1.194*** 
(5.70) 
1.126*** 
(14.93) 
0.0886 
(0.59) 
0.3460*** 
(6.90) 
.7062144*** 
(93.10) 
Observations  2,360 2,360 2,360 2,360 2,360 2,360 2,360 2,360 2,360 2,360 2,360 2,360 2,360 2,360 2,360 
Turning point 
(logged values)  
4.535 - - - - 6.240 6.250 6.099 5.932 5.447 4.846 4.451 7.439 
6.534 6.486 
Turning point 
(measurement 
units) 
3,429 
 
- - - - 
1,738 1,778 1,257 854 280 702 283 678 246 1,738 
Shape of curve  U-shape - - - - U-shape U-shape U-shape U-shape U-shape U-shape U-shape Inverted 
U-shape 
Inverted 
U-shape 
Inverted U-
shape 
Notes: The dependent variable in both models is the efficiency score (EFF) obtained by the DEA method. LHHI is the logged Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the fifty largest 
companies in the sector. LHHI2 is the squared logged Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the fifty largest companies in the sector. Model 1 was estimated using OLS and allowing 
for robust standard errors. Model 2 was estimated using the Bootstrapped quantile regressions methodology at different quantiles τ (0.01, 0.05, 0.10 0.15. 0.20. 0.25. 0.30, 0.40, 
0.50, 0.60, 0.70, 0.80) allowing for 100 repetitions. “-” means that the turning point cannot be estimated since the polynomial coefficients of the market concentration variable 
(HHI) are not statistically significant. + Denotes that the relevant estimates were drawn by using a quantile regression model.  The numbers in parentheses denote the t-statistics, 
while the numbers in square brackets are the p-values. Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10% respectively.  
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Table 2 reports the parametric results of our analysis. Specifically, column 1 
displays the regression findings using OLS and allowing for robust standard errors 
(Model 1), while columns 2–15 record the results at various quantiles obtained from 
the Bootstrapped instrumental quantile analysis allowing for 100 repetitions (Model 
2). In the case of Model 1 it is evident that all the coefficients are highly statistically 
significant alternating their signs starting from negative to positive. This implies that 
efficiency decreases up to a certain “turning” point (3,429) and then increases 
gradually, suggesting a non-monotonic ‘U’ shaped relationship between efficiency 
scores and market concentration.2  
In contrast, the results of the quantile approach for Model II highlight a 
different pattern (reported in columns 2–15 of Table 2). In particular, although the 
coefficients of the market concentration indicator (HHI) alternate their signs across all 
quantiles of the efficiency scores distribution, they are shown to be statistically 
significant from the 20th quantile, turning out to be insignificant at low quantiles (τ = 
0.01, 0.05, 0.10 and 0.15) of the conditional distribution (see columns 2-5). In 
addition, from the 20th until the 70th quantile the findings confirm the baseline results 
of Model 1 since all the coefficients are statistically significant alternating their signs 
from negative to positive (see columns 6-12). This clearly suggests the existence of a 
quadratic (non-linear) polynomial HHI form consisting of one “turning” point (‘U-
shaped curve). In other words, regional market structure level decreases up to a 
certain point (estimated low) and then increases.  
From the inspection of the relevant table, it is obvious that the turning points 
display significant variation around the median (50th quantile) with the estimated low 
to be appeared on the 70th quantile (283) and the estimated high on the first quartile 
(25th quantile) reflecting a value of 1,778. However, the previous findings are fully 
                                               
2 Alternatively we trace an inverted “U’ shape relationship between competition and efficiency.   
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reversed when we estimate the QR for higher quantiles (see columns 13-15). In other 
words, the relationship between efficiency and market structure remains non-
monotonic but with a different curvature (inverted U-shape). These findings indicate 
that as we are moving across a certain point (i.e threshold level) in the cumulative 
distribution of the dependent variable (efficiency), which in this case this is evident at 
the 70th quantile, market structure seems to generate a reversal effect on the level of 
industrial efficiency. In other words, in higher quantiles (see for example 95th 
quantile), the competition effect is so strong that shifts the U-shaped curve to the right 
due to the larger estimated turning point of 1,738 units compared to the previous 
quantiles of the efficiency distribution (678 and 246).3  
Having discussed the empirical findings of the two models, it is interesting to 
examine how each covariate’s effects vary across quantiles, and contrast them with 
the (fixed) OLS estimates (Model 1). The following diagram illustrates how the 
market structure effect vary over quantiles. It also shows how the magnitude of the 
effects at various quantiles differ considerably from the OLS coefficient, even in 
terms of the confidence intervals around each coefficient. Regarding the first 
polynomial term (LHHI) it is evident that its estimated coefficient takes negative 
values nearly across all the quantiles (see right side of the diagram).  
                                               
3 Since competition is the inverse of market concentration (HHI), the relationship between efficiency 
and polynomial powers of competition is of the U-shaped form.  
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Figure 1: Variation of LHHI estimates across quantiles for the year 2002 
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Notes: The dependent variable in both models (OLS and QR) is the efficiency scores obtained by the 
DEA method (EFF). LHHI is the logged Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the fifty largest companies in 
the sector. L2HHI is the squared logged Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the fifty largest companies in 
the sector. The bold dotted horizontal line denotes the fixed OLS estimate. The dotted lines and the 
grey area denote the confidence bands for the OLS and QR estimates respectively.      
 
However, from the 80th quantile, the estimates change their sign into positive. 
In contrast the squared polynomial term (L2HHI) follows the opposite direction 
taking firstly positive values and then negative ones (see lower left of the diagram). 
The above findings fully confirm the previous results indicating a different (inverted 
U-shaped) behavior of market structure across the higher quantiles of the efficiency 
distribution. Compared to the (fixed) OLS estimates, it is evident that for the market 
structure variable (HHI), the QR effects are much stronger at higher quantiles, with 
the OLS effect quite far from the median estimate (50th quantile). We also perform the 
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test for the equivalence of the quantile estimates across quantiles, which allows us to 
estimate the model for each of several quantiles in a single model, accounting for 
cross-equation hypothesis tests. The p-values (0.000 and 0.000) clearly reject equality 
of the estimated coefficients for the three quartiles (0.25, 0.50 and 0.75) in each of the 
two polynomial terms (LHHI and LHHI2). 
In the next stage we proceed with the OLS and QR estimates drawn from the 
post-crisis model (see Table 3). In this case, some interesting results emerge. First, the 
OLS estimates are not statistically significant despite the fact that the polynomial 
terms alternate their signs from negative to positive (see column 1). As a consequence 
the turning point and subsequently the shape of the relationship between efficiency 
and market structure cannot be estimated.    
Second, compared to the previous estimates of the pre-crisis model (see Table 
& Figure 1) the relationship between efficiency and market structure (competition) 
although non-monotonic depicts a completely different pattern. Specifically, in lower 
quantiles of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable (τ = 0.01, 0.05, 
0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25 and 0.30), the polynomial terms are statistically significant 
alternating their signs from positive to negative (see columns 2-8). This is consistent 
with the existence of an inverted U-shaped curve denoting that regional market 
structure level increases up to a certain point (estimated high) and then decreases. The 
magnitude of the turning points differ significantly across the lower quantiles ranging 
from 912 (1st quantile) to 3,415 (30th quantile). 
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Table 3: Estimation results for the year 2012  
Model 2 
Quantiles τ 
Variable  Model 1 
 
OLS Q (0.01) Q (0.05) Q(0.10) Q(0.15) Q(0.20) Q(0.25) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90)+ Q(0.92)+ 
LHHI -0.0206 
(-0.50) 
0.1044*** 
(3.86) 
0.110*** 
(12.06) 
0.143*** 
(10.78) 
0.257*** 
(7.14) 
0.275*** 
(8.96) 
0.292*** 
(3.85) 
0.265** 
(2.96) 
0.0109 
(0.17) 
-0.147 
(-0.82) 
-0.259 
(-1.82) 
-0.0730 
(-0.24) 
-0.701*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.006 
(0.93) 
-0.0064*** 
(12.90) 
LHHI2 0.00532 
(0.99) 
-0.0176*** 
(-3.81) 
-0.0166*** 
(-10.83) 
-0.0203*** 
(-9.64) 
-0.0373*** 
(-6.34) 
-0.0391*** 
(-8.47) 
-0.0426*** 
(-4.36) 
-0.0375*** 
(-3.56) 
-0.00169 
(-0.19) 
0.0170 
(0.71) 
0.0405* 
(2.19) 
0.0143 
(0.37) 
0.0996*** 
(3.91) 
0.0006 
(-0.70) 
0.0006*** 
(-10.21) 
Constant 0.536*** 
(6.95) 
0.0457* 
(1.83) 
0.0453*** 
(4.83) 
0.0172 
(1.16) 
-0.0865** 
(-2.64) 
-0.0985* 
(-2.15) 
-0.101 
(-0.70) 
-0.0400 
(-0.21) 
0.414** 
(3.27) 
0.777* 
(2.52) 
0.911*** 
(3.52) 
0.672 
(1.15) 
1.930*** 
(5.13) 
0.983*** 
(74.32) 
0.984*** 
(1074.19) 
Observations  2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 
Turning point 
(logged 
values)  
- 
2.960 3.313 3.522 3.445 3.517 3.427 3.533 
- - - - 
3.519 
- 
4.765 
Turning point 
(measurement 
units) 
- 
912 2,057 3,328 2,786 3,286 2,674 3,415 
- - - - 
3,304 
- 
582 
Shape of 
curve  
- Inverted  
U-shape 
Inverted  
U-shape 
Inverted  
U-shape 
Inverted 
U-shape 
Inverted 
U-shape 
Inverted 
U-shape 
Inverted 
U-shape 
- - - - U-shape - U-shape  
Notes: The dependent variable in both models is the efficiency score (EFF) obtained by the DEA method. LHHI is the logged Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the fifty largest 
companies in the sector. LHHI2 is the squared logged Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the fifty largest companies in the sector. Model 1 was estimated using OLS and allowing 
for robust standard errors. Model 2 was estimated using the Bootstrapped quantile regressions methodology at different quantiles τ (0.01, 0.05, 0.10 0.15. 0.20. 0.25. 0.30, 0.40, 
0.50, 0.60, 0.70, 0.80) allowing for 100 repetitions. “-” means that the turning point cannot be estimated since the polynomial coefficients of the market concentration variable 
(HHI) are not statistically significant. + Denotes that the relevant estimates were drawn by using a quantile regression model.  The numbers in parentheses denote the t-statistics, 
while the numbers in square brackets are the p-values. Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10% respectively.  
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Lastly, the estimates of the polynomial equation (Model 2) change their signs 
as we are moving across the conditional distribution of the dependent variable (50th 
quantile) starting from negative (LHHI) to positive (LHHI2). However, these 
estimates are not statistically significant and therefore the exact pattern of the 
relationship between market structure and efficiency cannot be determined. The 
situation clearly changes from the 80th quantile where there is a stable U-shaped 
pattern. Alternatively, competition and efficiency are linked with an inverted U-
shaped curve. Taken these together we argue that, in higher quantiles, the competition 
effect is not so strong induces the inverted U-shaped curve to shift to the left due to 
the smaller estimated turning point (582 vs 3,304).  
Similarly, Figure 2 portrays the variation of the polynomial estimates at 
various quantiles and in comparison with the OLS estimates. Regarding the first 
polynomial term (LHHI) it is evident that its estimated coefficient takes positive 
values nearly until the median, reversing fully its pattern henceforth. In contrast the 
squared polynomial term (L2HHI) follows the opposite direction taking firstly 
negative values and then positive ones. The above findings are consistent with a 
changing non-linear pattern between efficiency and market structure (competition). 
Moreover, we see that the effect of market structure differs considerably, having a 
strong effect on efficiency at lower quantiles and the median estimate is close to the 
OLS point estimate although not statistically significant. Lastly, we perform the test 
for the equivalence of the quantile estimates across quantiles. Similarly to the pre-
crisis model, the tests clearly reject equality of the estimated coefficients for the three 
quartiles (0.25, 0.50 and 0.75) in each of the two polynomial terms with p-values 
equal to 0.000 in both cases.   
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Figure 2: Variation of LHHI estimates across quantiles for the year 2012 
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Notes: The dependent variable in both models (OLS and QR) is the efficiency scores obtained by the 
DEA method (EFF). LHHI is the logged Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the fifty largest companies in 
the sector. L2HHI is the squared logged Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the fifty largest companies in 
the sector. The bold dotted horizontal line denotes the fixed OLS estimate. The dotted lines and the 
grey area denote the confidence bands for the OLS and QR estimates respectively.      
 
 
 
4.2  Robustness checks  
 
In order to check for the robustness of our findings, we re-estimate our model which 
is accordingly adjusted for the presence of an alternative concentration variable 
namely CR8. This structural indicator captures the impact of the eight largest firms 
(measured on a 1-100 scale) in the industry. The empirical results when a different 
concentration ratio is taken into consideration do not reveal significant differences 
regarding the behaviour and the relevant estimates of the polynomial form.  
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Regarding the pre-crisis model (2002), we observe that market structure 
affects efficiency in a non-linear way expressed by a U-shaped curve until the 70th 
quantile (see columns 2-12 of Table 4). It is worth mentioning that the OLS estimates 
are statistically significant and in alignment with the previous finding (see column 1). 
This trend is interrupted as we are moving across the higher quantiles of the 
distribution (see columns 13-15). Specifically, the relationship between efficiency and 
market structure remains non-monotonic but with a different curvature (inverted U-
shape). In other words, from the 80th quantile, market structure seems to generate a 
reversal effect on the level of industrial efficiency. The above findings are also 
reported in Figure 3. From the inspection of the relevant figure, we argue that the 
effect of market structure differs considerably, having a strong effect on efficiency at 
higher quantiles and the median estimate is far from the OLS point estimate although 
statistically significant.  
Lastly, we conclude our analysis with the description of the empirical findings 
of the post-crisis model (2012) drawn from the two estimation techniques (OLS and 
QR). The relevant estimates are reported in Table 5. As a general statement, we may 
argue that the OLS and QR estimates are statistically significant in the majority of the 
quantiles.  
This means that in higher quantiles the competition effect shifts the U-shaped 
curve to the right due to the larger estimated turning point (85) compared to the 
previous quantiles of the efficiency distribution (46 and 11). In other words, after the 
global financial crisis that also hit the USA, market concentration (competition) in the 
industrial sectors is related with a decrease (increase) of the efficiency after crossing a 
relatively high threshold (85). In this case, the impact of concentration on industrial 
efficiency alternates its sign depending on the different competitive regime (low vs 
high concentration). The latter is also evident in the following diagram.      
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Table 4: Estimation results for the year 2002 
Model 4 Model 
3 Quantiles τ 
Variable 
OLS Q(0.01) Q (0.05) Q(0.10) Q(0.15) Q(0.20) Q(0.25) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90)+ Q(0.95)+ 
ln(CR8) -0.147** 
(-2.71) 
-.00123*** 
(-3.63) 
-0.00245 
(-0.72) 
-0.0179 
(-0.82) 
-0.134* 
(-2.18) 
-0.338*** 
(-5.28) 
-0.333*** 
(-31.73) 
-0.344*** 
(-17.71) 
-0.337*** 
(-10.49) 
-0.456*** 
(-5.04) 
-0.707* 
(-2.48) 
-0.591** 
(-3.12) 
0.299 
(1.63) 
0.555*** 
(10.01) 
0.213*** 
(47.08) 
ln(CR8)2 0.0249** 
(3.04) 
.00016*** 
(3.61) 
0.000296 
(0.70) 
0.00221 
(0.80) 
0.0168* 
(2.14) 
0.0423*** 
(5.27) 
0.0417*** 
(25.27) 
0.0432*** 
(14.54) 
0.0428*** 
(9.04) 
0.0628*** 
(4.35) 
0.112* 
(2.55) 
0.0998*** 
(3.35) 
-0.0239 
(-0.89) 
-0.069*** 
(-8.76) 
-0.026*** 
(-40.48) 
Constant 0.856*** 
(10.09) 
.5024553*** 
(748.31) 
0.505*** 
(75.10) 
0.536*** 
(12.51) 
0.771*** 
(6.31) 
1.180*** 
(9.18) 
1.172*** 
(73.48) 
1.186*** 
(38.64) 
1.186*** 
(22.96) 
1.369*** 
(10.22) 
1.693*** 
(3.92) 
1.529*** 
(5.48) 
0.134 
(0.48) 
-0.100 
(-1.06) 
0.573*** 
(73.89) 
Observations  2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 
Turning point 
(logged 
values)  
 2.952    4.060 - -  4.018     4.017     4.026     3.981     3.937     3.631     3.156     2.961     - 
3.991 4.058 
Turning point 
(measurement 
units) 
 9 11  -  - 
97 99 98 
 96  86  43  14   9  - 
10 11 
Shape of 
curve  
U-shape U-shape - - U-
shape 
U-shape U-shape U-shape U-shape U-shape U-
shape 
U-shape - Inverted 
U-shape 
Inverted U-
shape 
Notes: The dependent variable in both models is the efficiency scores obtained by the DEA method (EFF). Ln(CR8) is the sum of the market shares of the eight larger 
companies in the sector. Ln(CR8)2 is the squared sum of the market shares of the eight larger companies in the sector. Model 3 was estimated using OLS and allowing for 
robust standard errors. Model 4 was estimated using the Bootstrapped quantile regressions methodology at different quantiles τ (0.01, 0.05, 0.10 0.15. 0.20. 0.25. 0.30, 0.40, 
0.50, 0.60, 0.70, 0.80) allowing for 100 repetitions. “-” means that the turning point cannot be estimated since the polynomial coefficients of the market concentration variable 
(CR8) are not statistically significant. + Denotes that the relevant estimates were drawn by using a quantile regression model. The numbers in parentheses denote the t-statistics, 
while the numbers in square brackets are the p-values. Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10% respectively.  
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Figure 3: Variation of LCR8 estimates across quantiles for the year 2002 
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Notes: The dependent variable in both models (OLS and QR) is the efficiency scores obtained by the 
DEA method (EFF). LCR8 is the sum of the market shares of the eight larger companies in the sector. 
L2CR8 is the squared sum of the market shares of the eight larger companies in the sector. The bold 
dotted horizontal line denotes the fixed OLS estimate. The dotted lines and the grey area denote the 
confidence bands for the OLS and QR estimates respectively.       
 
A closer look though at the estimation results reveals significant differences. More 
specifically, the OLS estimates uncover a non-monotonic U-shape form between 
efficiency and market structure, which is evident also in most of the quantiles from 
the 25th (first quartile) to the 70th quantile (see columns, 7-12). This is in contrast with 
the previous baseline findings where market structure was proxied by the HHI (see 
Table 3). Another interesting result is that the conditional distribution of efficiency is 
fully reversed in higher quantiles (from 80th quantile) revealing an inverted U-shaped 
form.     
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Table 5: Estimation results for the year 2012 
Model 4 Model 3 
Quantiles τ 
Variable 
OLS Q(0.01) Q (0.05) Q(0.10) Q(0.15) Q(0.20) Q(0.25) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) Q(0.95) 
ln(CR8) -0.211* 
(-2.46) 
-0.0355 
(-0.72) 
-0.0632 
(-0.43) 
0.118 
(0.78) 
0.103* 
(1.53) 
0.00630 
(0.09) 
-0.208** 
(-2.58) 
-0.347*** 
(-4.08) 
-0.212* 
(-1.88) 
-0.687* 
(-1.85) 
 
-1.004*** 
(-4.56) 
-0.760* 
(-1.90) 
0.801** 
(2.64) 
0.9476*** 
(5.09) 
0.6398*** 
(7.70) 
ln(CR8)2 0.0338** 
(2.71) 
-0.0054 
(-0.64) 
0.00121 
(0.06) 
-0.0334 
(-1.51) 
-
0.0313** 
(-3.13) 
-0.0137 
(-1.26) 
0.0211 
(1.62) 
0.0465*** 
(3.41) 
0.0351* 
(2.09) 
0.0974* 
(2.09) 
0.137*** 
(4.22) 
0.116* 
(1.91) 
-0.0859* 
(-1.99) 
-0.1172*** 
(-5.02) 
-
0.0814*** 
-7.64 
Constant 0.854*** 
(5.97) 
0.38665*** 
(5.27) 
0.409 
(1.49) 
0.306 
(1.25) 
0.361*** 
(3.33) 
0.493*** 
(4.97) 
0.806*** 
(6.83) 
0.994*** 
(7.90) 
0.737*** 
(3.84) 
1.669* 
(2.26) 
2.337*** 
(6.60) 
1.845** 
(2.90) 
-0.863* 
(-1.72) 
-0.9074** 
(-2.46) 
-0.2461* 
(-1.52) 
Observations  2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 
Turning point 
(logged values)  3.121 
- - - 
1.645 
- 
4.929 3.731 3.020 3.527 3.664 3.276 4.662 4.043 3.930 
Turning point 
(measurement 
units) 
13 - - - 44 - 85 54 10 34 46 19 46 11 85 
Shape of curve  U-shape - - - Inverted 
U-shape 
- U-shape U-shape U-
shape 
U-
shape 
U-shape U-shape Inverted 
U-shape 
Inverted 
U-shape 
Inverted 
U-shape 
Notes: The dependent variable in both models is the efficiency scores obtained by the DEA method (EFF). Ln(CR8) is the sum of the market shares of the eight larger 
companies in the sector. Ln(CR8)2 is the squared sum of the market shares of the eight larger companies in the sector. Model 3 was estimated using OLS and allowing for 
robust standard errors. Model 4 was estimated using the Bootstrapped quantile regressions methodology at different quantiles τ (0.01, 0.05, 0.10 0.15. 0.20. 0.25. 0.30, 0.40, 
0.50, 0.60, 0.70, 0.80) allowing for 100 repetitions. “-” means that the turning point cannot be estimated since the polynomial coefficients of the market concentration variable 
(CR8) are not statistically significant. The numbers in parentheses denote the t-statistics, while the numbers in square brackets are the p-values. Significant at ***1%, **5% and 
*10% respectively.  
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Figure 4: Variation of LCR8 estimates across quantiles, and with the (fixed) OLS 
estimates for the year 2012 
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Notes: The dependent variable in both models (OLS and QR) is the efficiency scores obtained by the 
DEA method (EFF). LCR8 is the sum of the market shares of the eight larger companies in the sector. 
L2CR8 is the squared sum of the market shares of the eight larger companies in the sector. The bold 
dotted horizontal line denotes the fixed OLS estimate. The dotted lines and the grey area denote the 
confidence bands for the OLS and QR estimates respectively.       
 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
In this study, we use a unique data set at the plant level comprising by hundreds of 
industrial facilities dispersed among the US states before and after the financial crisis 
(2002 and 2008), in order to delineate the effects of industrial pollution prevention 
activities on toxic chemical releases under the presence of two market regimes 
(competitive and non-competitive conditions).  
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In order to measure the relevant efficiency scores, we use DEA techniques 
allowing for the inclusion of desirable and undesirable (toxic chemical releases) 
outputs in the production function. In the next stage, we utilise the bootstrapped 
quantile regression methodology to uncover possible non-linear relationships between 
efficiency and competition at the mean and at various quantiles. In this way, we 
impose no functional form constraints on parameter values over the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable (efficiency). At the same time, we estimate at 
which part of its conditional distribution function, the efficiency is located and draw 
substantial conclusions about the range of policy measures obtained. 
Our empirical findings justify for the first time in the empirical literature the 
existence of a non-monotonic relationship between market concentration 
(competition) and efficiency in the industrial sector. Moreover, we notice that the 
relationship between efficiency and market concentration did not remain unchanged 
in the aftermath of the economic crisis. This relationship provides new insights into 
the environmental policy since the regulators must take into account if they are on the 
upward or the downward slopping part of the curve in order to pursue the effective 
environmental policies. Moreover, we argue that the existence of a non-linear 
relationship when toxic chemical releases form the undesirable output in the 
production process provides new insights into the policy agenda toward emissions 
releases abatement. This means that policy makers and practitioners must take into 
account if they are on the upward or the downward slopping part of the curve. It is 
worth emphasizing that the increasing nonparametric regression line up to a certain 
concentration level approximately indicates a negative effect on facilities’ emissions 
levels whereas a decreasing line indicates a positive effect.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1A: Empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of efficiency (2002).  
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Notes: The continuous (blue) line is the estimated CDF associated with the dependent variable (EFF) 
across the various quantiles (τ) for the year 2002. The vertical (red) lines represent the 10th, 50th 
(median) and 90th quantile respectively.    
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Figure 2A: Empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of efficiency (2012).  
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Notes: The continuous (blue) line is the estimated CDF associated with the dependent variable (EFF) 
across the various quantiles (τ) for the year 2012. The vertical (red) lines represent the 10th, 50th 
(median) and 90th quantile respectively.    
 
 
 
 
